11/06/2026
🔥 Case Study 🔥
The pressure-relief valve functioned as intended, but it discharged the gas into an area where workers were carrying out welding activities.
This is the story of the Kuraray America chemical plant fire on May 19, 2018, in Pasadena, Texas, USA.
At the time, the plant was preparing to restart a chemical reactor following a scheduled maintenance shutdown.
During the startup process, an abnormal high-pressure condition developed inside Reactor 2. The reactor pressure continued rising, even after operators stopped adding ethylene.
The high-pressure alarm activated, but the situation was not brought under control. A high-high-pressure safety interlock that should have helped protect the reactor had been disabled.
The problem started when ethylene vapour condensed inside the reactor, forming liquid ethylene and creating an unusually low-temperature condition.
As operators attempted to correct the condition by heating the reactor, some of the liquid ethylene vaporised. This caused the pressure to rise further.
At approximately 10:28 a.m., the emergency pressure-relief system activated. A rupture disc burst, allowing the spring-loaded relief valve to open and discharge the excess pressure.
But instead of directing the flammable gas to a safe location, the discharge piping released it horizontally into the work area.
Approximately 2,347 pounds of ethylene gas escaped in less than three minutes.
Contractors were working nearby, and some were carrying out welding activities. The escaping gas cloud encountered an ignition source, most likely from the welding work, and caught fire.
Workers in the area scrambled to escape. Some jumped from the second and third levels of the plant structure, while others tripped, fell or suffered injuries trying to get away. Some workers wearing fall-protection equipment were delayed because they were attached to structures.
The incident injured 23 workers, including one who suffered life-threatening burns but survived.
The pressure-relief valve worked as intended, but its discharge arrangement put workers directly in danger. Protecting equipment from overpressure should never come at the expense of workers' lives.
What do you think? Should pressure-relief systems that discharge flammable gases directly into the atmosphere be acceptable when a flare system or another safer arrangement is possible?
Source: US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB), Kuraray Pasadena Release and Fire – Investigation